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IC 77-2368

• 5 OCT 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Nuclear Test and Proliferation Monitoring

REFERENCE: Note to A/D/DCI fr DCI dated 29 Sept 1977

1. (U) Action Requested: Review and sign attached correspondence (revised).

2. (U) Background: Per your note (reference), I have had the attached correspondence revised to alter the role of the NIO in strategy development. However, I do not believe that we should seek to remove the NIOs entirely, inasmuch as close coordination between collection and production is essential to the development and implementation of effective intelligence strategy. The collection committees alone cannot provide this substantive interaction.

3. (U) Looking toward NITC activation, our intelligence strategy program is concentrating on the area that falls between the establishment of an intelligence objective and its translation into specific collection tasking. This is where the greatest gains can be made in both the management of collection resources and the coordination of Community operations across functional and disciplinary lines. To achieve these gains, NITC needs to:

-- cause intelligence producers and consumers to state their information requirements with sufficient specificity to permit a focused rather than shotgun approach to collection (as leading players on the producer side, the NIOs must play some role in this);

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SUBJECT: Nuclear Test and Proliferation Monitoring

-- use the intelligence strategy mechanism to structure interaction between collectors and producers so as to develop coherent, multidisciplinary efforts against intelligence objectives; and

-- work continuously with producers to adjust intelligence strategy and collection tasking to meet changes in the situations and user support requirements being addressed.

3. (U) Recommended Action: It is recommended you sign the attached correspondence as revised. The approach to strategy development taken therein, reflects the NITC concept outlined above. The Intelligence Community Staff will act for NITC pending its activation.

[Redacted Signature Box]

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John N. McMahon

Attachment:

Proposed Multiple Adse memo fm DCI,
Subject: Nuclear Test and
Proliferation Monitoring

While the IC Staff (NITC) can do a great deal of the mechanics and leg work associated with developing the "collection strategy" - the NIOs have to play a substantive role in the development otherwise they will be paper thin

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

11 OCT 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Deputy Assistant Administrator for
National Security, Energy Research
and Development Administration
Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee

SUBJECT: Nuclear Test and Proliferation Monitoring (S)

1. (S) In order to insure maintenance of an effective intelligence monitoring program to provide early warning of nuclear proliferation activities, I direct that a series of country-specific intelligence strategies be developed that will address, in requisite detail:

--the warning indications environment with respect to nuclear proliferation;

--the optimum focusing of available intelligence collection resources on that environment; and

--requirements for additional collection and production initiatives, their perceived benefits and costs.

2. (S) The first step is to prepare detailed analyses of the countries to be addressed in order to identify potential sources of indications bearing on nuclear proliferation activity. The attachment provides further insight into this task. Preparation of these analyses will be a Community effort and will utilize the Critical Collection Problems Committee nuclear proliferation study currently in draft as a point of departure.

3. (S) Following their completion, collection program managers will be tasked to address the foregoing analyses in order to:

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EO (1), (3), (5) and (6) (1) (2) or more)
Automatic declassification
DATE FOR REVIEW BY ONE
(unless reported, insert date or event)

SUBJECT: Nuclear Proliferation (S)

--estimate for each country addressed the extent of coverage and potential intelligence yield afforded identified target focal points by currently assigned collection assets;

--determine potential adjustments to current posture that could improve target coverage and intelligence yield utilizing redirected collection resources in being; indicate costs and trade-off implications;

--provide recommendations concerning new intelligence collection initiatives offering prospect of enhanced indications source coverage and data yield; estimate cost/benefit profile, risks and operational availability.

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5. (C) The strategies developed will constitute the basis for coordination of an integrated current intelligence effort. Their substance and implementation will, therefore, require systematic monitoring and updating over time. Responsibility for coordinating strategy development, maintenance and implementation, particularly with respect to interaction between intelligence collection and production operations, is assigned to the Intelligence Community Staff pending activation of the National Intelligence Tasking Center.

6. (U) Please advise of your principal action officer assignments.

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SIGNED

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment:
Targets Analysis Requirements

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